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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS 
AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE US SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT PERSPECTIVE 
 
Marc Massoud*, E. Daniel Shim** 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to review US corporate governance systems and to highlight the mandated 
roles of audit committee and external auditor within the SOX Act. In addition, it discusses requirements 
and implications of the SOX Act for the foreign accounting firms and multinational corporations. Finally 
this paper provides a perspective on improvement of corporate governance and financial integrity. In 
order to regain trust from the financial market, the SOX Act mandates (1) to improve auditor’s  
independence by reducing conflicts of interest; (2) to increase corporate financial reporting responsibility 
by requiring a CEO or a CFO certify accuracy of annual report; and (3) to enhance financial disclosures. It 
also significantly increase criminal penalty for non-compliance. The authors believe that the combination 
of strengthening auditor’s independence, increased corporate responsibility and severe penalty and 
restored corporate governance would create an environment that is intended by the SOX Act. Volker and 
Levitt (2004) put it very forceful way: “While there are direct money costs involved in good corporate 
governance, we believe that an investment in good corporate governance, professional integrity and 
transparency will pay dividends in the form of investor confidence, more efficient markets and more 
market participation for years to come.” We concur with them and believe that the SOX Act will help in 
restoring trust in corporate governance and improve financial integrity and quality of financial 
information. We also agree that the benefits of the SOX Act will outweigh the costs of compliance in the 
long-run.  
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Introduction 
 
The US historically has had the most robust capital 
markets in the world in large part due to better 
corporate governance systems. It is undeniable now 
that most US capital markets participants including 
financial analysts, accountants and regulators are under 
attack. As more and more disclosures have come to 
light, many of these market participants have shown to 
behave irresponsibly, unethically and/or illegally.  
“Shortly after the Enron scandal, other scandals 
involving corporate giant (Tyoc, WorldCom, Xerox, 
Adephia, Ahold, etc), brokerage firms (e.g., Merrill 
Lynch), stock exchanges (e.g., New York Stock 
Exchange), large public accounting firms (e.g., Arthur 
Anderson, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) and managers of mutual 
funds (e.g., Piper Jaffray) were uncovered.” (Corporate 
Governance and SEC, Skousen, Glover and Prawitt, 
2005, p.5)  
Confidence in our capital markets has been 
undermined. Restoring the trust and credibility of 
markets is one of the most important missions for all 
parties concerned. Investors and public were initially 
misled and then punished as the bubble expanded and 
burst amidst a blaze of corporate misdeeds. Major fraud 
cases over the last three years have destroyed over 
$200 billion of equity value (Gadiesh, 2004). 
Recently, we all have heard the same questions 
over and over again: What happened to the US capital 
market systems? Where were the board of directors and 
the corporate governance? Where were the competent 
and self-governing external auditors?  Where were the 
lawyers, the guardians of the systems? Where were the 
investment bankers and the financial analysts, the 
prodigies of the fuel that fed the bubble?  
Perhaps greed and conflict of interests prevented 
the participants from performing their respective 
functions properly. Many forgot that their actions and 
in-actions put their most valuable assets, the credibility 
as well as the interests of their shareholders at risk. 
Their reputation may never be regained or may take 
years to refurbish. 
The essence of the good governance system is the 
proper stewardship; monitoring and managing people, 
processes and activities of a corporation on behalf of 
owners, shareholders. Good corporate governance 
creates a system that demands proper stewardship over 
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invested capital and faithfully reports the economic 
condition and performance of the enterprise (Skousen 
et al, 2004. p.7).That money, invested by the 
shareholders, is to be protected. The board of directors 
is supposed to monitor the management and external 
auditor are responsible in providing assurance and in 
attesting financial integrity and financial well-being of 
a corporation and in reporting its opinion to 
shareholders and management. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and to highlight the 
mandated roles of audit committee and external auditor 
within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and to examine whether 
these requirements will improve corporate governance 
and financial integrity. In addition, it also discusses 
requirements and implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act for the foreign multinational corporations, required 
to register with US SEC.  
The reminder of the papers is as follows: The 
second section will provide an overview of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the required role of audit 
committee and external auditor. The third section 
discusses the requirements and implications of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to the foreign accounting firms 
and multinational corporations. The fourth section 
discusses corporate governance of UK and Germany. 
The final section provides perspectives and 
implications of the SOX Act.  
 
The role of audit committee and external 
auditors within the Sarbanes-Oxley act for 
US corporations 
 
McEachern and Massoud (1990) suggest that “the main 
role of the audit committee is to oversee the financial 
reporting process and enhance the credibility of that 
process.” 
The SOX Act establishes new responsibilities for 
the audit committee in its capacity as a committee of 
the board of directors. The responsibilities include the 
appointment of the external auditor, determination of 
audit fees and oversight of the auditor. The audit 
committee must pre-approve all services provided by 
external auditor, after determining that the services do 
not pose conflict with the auditor’s independence. 
Moreover, audit committee must be comprised of 
independent directors and, among other things, whether 
at least one member have to meet the specified criteria 
of an “audit committee financial expert.” In addition 
external auditor is required to directly report to the 
audit committee which has new and expanded 
obligations to serve on behalf of the board of directors 
as the watchful guardian of shareholders interests. Thus 
the SOX Act strengthened and expanded the audit 
committee responsibilities. Table 1 summarizes the 
responsibility and relationship of Audit Committee and 
external auditor. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 Here 
----------------------------------------- 
In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates 
establishment of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB). The Board is a non-profit 
organization to oversee the accounting and auditing 
standards of the public companies. The purpose of 
PCAOB is to protect the interests of the investors and 
to further the public interests by monitoring for an 
informative, fair and independent audit report. In 
March 2004, the PCAOB approved the first important 
standard, “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting Performed in conjunction with an Audit of 
Financial Statement.” Section 404 (a) of SOX and 
SEC’s related implementation rule require the 
management of public company to assess the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal control on 
financial reporting. Section 404(b) as well as Section 
103 directed PCAOB to establish the professional 
standards governing independent auditor and assessing 
the effectiveness of internal controls. The new standard 
requires auditors to review management assessment of 
the effectiveness of company internal controls, run their 
own tests of those controls and judge the effectiveness 
of corporate board members who sits on a firm’s audit 
committee (www.pcaobus.org). The PCAOB in effect 
ended self-regulations of auditing and attestation 
standards, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS).   
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley act requirements and 
implications to the foreign accounting firm 
and multinational corporations 
 
According to Section 106 of the SOX Act, foreign 
public accounting firms who audit a U.S. company 
required to register with the PACOB. This would 
include foreign firms that perform some audit work, 
such as in a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company, that 
is relied on by the primary auditor. The Board exercises 
authority over these foreign accounting firms. Foreign 
accounting firms that "prepare or furnish" an audit 
report involving U.S. registrants are subject to the 
authority of the Board. Additionally, if a registered U.S. 
accounting firm relies on the opinion of a foreign 
accounting firm, the foreign firm's audit workpapers 
must be supplied upon request to the Board or the 
Commission (AICPA, 2004).   
The Securities and Exchange Commission adopted 
rules that the national securities exchanges and national 
securities associations should prohibit the listing of any 
security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the 
audit committee requirements established by the SOX 
Act.  Table 2 summarizes the detailed requirement: 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------------ 
Generally, listed issuers are required to comply 
with the new listing rules by the date of their first 
annual shareholders meetings after Jan. 15, 2004, but in 
any event no later than Oct. 31, 2004. Foreign private 
issuers and small business issuers will be required to 
comply by July 31, 2005. Many will argue that those 
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requirements will lead to a decrease in number of 
foreign company listed in the US exchange. Until now 
it is difficult to speculate about the effect of this 
requirement. 
 
Corporate goverance in the UK and 
Germany 
 
One of major issues about requiring foreign companies 
to adopt the SOX Act is that many foreign companies 
have their own country’s corporate governance rules. 
According to section 301 of the SOX Act, foreign 
corporations listing security in the US national 
securities exchanges and national securities 
associations should adhere to the audit committee 
requirements. The following presents a highlighted 
summary of corporate governance of UK and Germany.  
United Kingdom. In 1992, the Cadbury 
Committee (The Committee on the financial aspect of 
corporate Governance) investigated the accountability 
of the Board of Directors to shareholders and to society 
as a whole. The committee made recommendations to 
improve financial reporting, accountability and Board 
of Directors’ oversight. The Cadbury Committee 
recommendations led to the Greenbury Report in 1995. 
The Greenbury Report recommended to establish 
extensive disclosures on directors’ remuneration in the 
annual report of the UK companies. The Hempel report 
in 1998 confirmed much of the work of Cadbury and 
Greenbury Committees. That has led to the Confined 
Code on Corporate Governance (2003). Compliance 
with these codes is a part of stock exchange 
requirement. 
This code requires that the annual report of a major 
UK company should contain a report from the 
remuneration committee, a statement on corporate 
governance, a statement on internal controls, a 
statement on the going concern status of company and 
a statement of the directors’ responsibilities. The 
following is a list of requirement that differs from 
under the SOX regulations: 
1. The chair of the board should meet with 
non-executive directors without the 
executive present. 
2. Led by the senior independent director, the 
non-executive directors should meet without 
the chair present at least annually to 
appraise her performance and on such other 
occasions as are deemed appropriate.  
3. The chair of the board and CEO should be 
separated. The division of responsibilities 
should be clearly established, set out in 
writing, and agreed by the board. 
4. At least half of the board, excluding the 
chair, should be comprised of non-executive 
directors and should be independent. 
5. The board should appoint one of the 
independent non-executive directors to be 
the senior independent director. The senior 
independent director should be available to 
shareholders if they have concerns that have 
not been alleviated by top company officials.  
6. Shareholders should be invited specially to 
approve all new long-term incentive 
arrangements and significant changes to 
existing schemes unless prohibited by the 
Listing Rules. 
A recent survey of 310 service executives around 
world indicates that the US is generally ahead of the 
pack in corporate governance (KPMG, 2003).
 
 Germany UK US 
1. Which of the following countries has done most to improve 
standards of corporate governance over the past year? 
7% 16% 71% 
2. Which of the following countries has the farthest to go in improving 
standards of corporate governance? 
7% 6% 23% 
 
Germany. The German systems of corporate 
governance reflect their unique structures of legal 
rights and arrangements. The corporate decision-
making process and corporate governance are shared 
among stakeholders, shareholders, employees, and 
customers. This broad view “encompasses the product 
markets, the capital and labor markets, any informal 
organizational arrangements which may exist and 
function alongside the formal structure.” 
Germany has a strong employee co-determination 
program. Work councils have extensive participation in 
decision-makings and employees are also respected in 
the corporate boardroom. These differences are 
contrasted with the shareholder-oriented approach to 
corporate governance in the US. 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of 
German corporate governance is the two-tier board of 
directors system.  The two-tier system of governance 
creates different rights and obligations for member of 
each board that are set out in the German Stock 
Corporation Act and German Corporate Governance 
Code. Figure 1 shows the relationships with key 
stakeholders groups. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
------------------------------------------- 
The management board is charged with managing 
the enterprise for the benefit of a wide array of 
stakeholders. The supervisory board, whose members 
are elected by the shareholders at the annual meeting, 
does not have the formal right to give specific 
instructions to members of the management board, but 
management board is required to report to the 
supervisory board at regular intervals. The major 
functions of the supervisory board are to appoint and 
dismiss the members of the management board and to 
determine management remuneration. The management 
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board normally takes into consideration on specific 
position of the supervisory board.  
A potential problem in the German corporate 
governance is the dual obligations of members of the 
supervisory board. On one hand, they are obliged to act 
in the best interests of the company while on the other 
hand they have certain obligations toward their specific 
constituencies. This conflict of interests may influence 
the role and actions of the supervisory board. 
The German Stock Corporation Act and German 
Commercial Codes establish the regulations for the 
preparation of financial statements. The act also details 
Audit requirements. Table 1 demonstrates these 
provisions and compares the functions of the 
management board in Germany and US.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 Here 
--------------------------------------------- 
The functions of the supervisory board are similar 
to that of the audit committee in the US.  A comparison 
of the German and US requirement indicates two 
important differences: First, employee participation in 
decision-making process is an integral part of the 
German governance systems while no employee 
participation is presented in the US systems. Second, 
the German system relies more on a consensus of 
decision-makers, which take into consideration all the 
stakeholders in addition to shareholders. 
    
Perspective and implication of SOX act 
 
The SOX Act poses new challenges to management. 
The new legislation puts on a significant the 
responsibility for fraud detection, though it does not 
relieve duties of the audit committee or the auditor. The 
board of directors and audit committee are ultimately 
responsible for overseeing management’s assessment 
of fraud and the entity programs and its control systems. 
The audit committee is expected to investigate alleged 
wrongdoing brought to its attention.    
The SEC implementation rules for SOX made it 
clear that increased transparency of financial 
information is central to the new regulation. “By 
increasing transparency regarding key aspects of 
corporate activities and control, the proposals are 
designed to improve the quality of information 
available to the investor. (www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8177.htm) 
In order to regain trust from the financial market, 
the SOX Act mandates (1) to improve auditor’s  
independence by reducing conflicts of interest; (2) to 
increase corporate financial reporting responsibility by 
requiring a CEO or a CFO certify accuracy of annual 
report; and (3) to enhance financial disclosures. It also 
significantly increase criminal penalty for non-
compliance.  
Auditors Independence. The SOX Act attempts 
to ensure auditor independence. The law contains 
significant provisions designed to strengthen both the 
fact and perception of auditor independence. The 
auditor is required to directly report to the company’s 
audit committee which has new and expanded 
obligations to serve on behalf of the board of the 
directors as the watchful guidance of shareholder’s 
interests. In the past, management has been a primary 
contact for the external auditor’s communication with 
the audit committee. However the audit committee is 
now the appropriate contact for the external auditors. 
Corporate Responsibility and Severe Penalty 
SOX affirms that CEO and CFO carry primary 
responsibility for company financial reports filed with 
the SEC and require them to certify the completeness 
and accuracy of information and the effectiveness of 
internal control. If an executive certify a report that turn 
out to be false and misleading, he/she will be facing 
severe criminal charges, a possibility of up to 20 years 
in prison. Certifying officers can also be forced to 
reimburse all or part of compensations earned based on 
erroneous financial statements. 
Can the SOX Help Regain Public Trust? The 
single most important question is whether the SOX Act 
will produce what was its primary intended goal: 
Regain public trust and the elimination of massive 
companywide abuses and financial fraud that rocked 
US corporations and capital market particip-ants 
recently.  To name a few: Enron, Global Crossing, 
Tyco Internationals and WorldCom. So far the law has 
been good for shareholders, good for companies and 
good for government. SOX got people focused on 
quality and integrity of financial reports.   
Many companies recently hired Chief Governance 
Officer (CGO) and Chief Compliance Officer (CCO). 
The CCO is supposed to monitor company’s internal 
control systems while CGO makes sure that the board 
properly functions. The companies instituted CGO or 
CCO includes Hershey Foods, Motorola, Pitney Bowes, 
Pfizer, Estman Kodak, Sunoco, and American Express.    
The provision causing the most trouble is Section 404 
which requires CEO and CFO to assess the adequacy of 
their company’s internal control. This simply stated 
goal turns out to require a vast amount of work. In 
many cases, this led many firms to do massive overhaul 
of their information technology systems which requires 
huge expenditures.  
The combination of strengthening auditor’s 
independence, increased corporate responsibility and 
severe penalty and restored corporate governance 
would create environment that is intended by SOX Act. 
Volker and Levitt (2004) put it in a very forceful way: 
“While there are direct money costs involved in good 
corporate governance, we believe that an investment in 
good corporate governance, professional integrity and 
transparency will pay dividends in the form of investor 
confidence, more efficient markets and more market 
participation for years to come.”  We concur with them 
and believe the benefits of the SOX Act will outweigh 
the costs of compliance.  
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Appendices 
Table 1. New Roles for Audit Committees and Auditors. (AICPA 2004). 
1. Auditors Report to Audit Committee. Now, auditors will report to and be overseen by a company's audit committee, 
not management.  
2. Audit Committees Must Approve All Services. Audit committees must preapprove all services (both audit and non-
audit services not specifically prohibited) provided by its auditor.  
3. Auditor Must Report New Information to Audit Committee. This information includes: critical accounting policies and 
practices to be used, alternative treatments of financial information within GAAP that have been discussed with 
management, accounting disagreements between the auditor and management, and other relevant communications 
between the auditor and management. 
4. Offering Specified Non-Audit Services Prohibited. The new law statutorily prohibits auditors from offering certain 
non-audit services to audit clients. These services include: bookkeeping, information systems design and 
implementation, appraisals or valuation services, actuarial services, internal audits, management and human resources 
services, broker/dealer and investment banking services, legal or expert services unrelated to audit services and other 
services the board determines by rule to be impermissible. Other nonaudit services not banned are allowed if 
preapproved by the audit committee.  
5. Audit Partner Rotation. The lead audit partner and audit review partner must be rotated every five years on public 
company engagements.  
6. Employment Implications. An accounting firm will not be able to provide audit services to a public company if one of 
that company's top officials (CEO, Controller, CFO, Chief Accounting Officer, etc.) was employed by the firm and 
worked on the company's audit during the previous year.  
Table 2. Requirement for foreign multinational corporations 
Under the new rules, national securities exchanges and national securities associations will be prohibited from listing any 
security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the following requirements. 
1. Each member of the audit committee of the issuer must be independent according to the specified criteria in Section 
10A(m) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
2. The audit committee must be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the 
work of any registered public accounting firm engaged for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or 
performing other audit, review or attest services for the issuer, and the registered public accounting firm must report 
directly to the audit committee. 
3. The audit committee must establish procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints regarding 
accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing matters, including procedures for the confidential, anonymous 
submission by employees of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters. 
4. The audit committee must have the authority to engage independent counsel and other advisors, as it determines 
necessary to carry out its duties. 
5. The issuer must provide appropriate funding for the audit committee. 
The new rules will establish Section 10A(m)'s two criteria for audit committee member independence. 
1. Audit committee members must be barred from accepting any consulting, advisory or compensatory fee from the 
issuer or any subsidiary, other than in the member's capacity as a member of the board or any board committee. 
2. An audit committee member must not be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary apart from capacity as a 
member of the board or any board committee. 
The new rules will apply to both domestic and foreign listed issuers. It is important to note that, based on significant input from 
and dialogue with foreign regulators and foreign issuers and their advisers, several provisions, applicable only to foreign private 
issuers, have been included that seek to address the special circumstances of particular foreign jurisdictions. These provisions 
include 
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Shareholders Meeting 
Bank Proxy Votes
 
Supervisory Board 
 
 
Management 
Board 
 
Works 
Council 
 
     Employees 
Labor Unions 
often propose 
external 
representative 
Information, 
Consultation, 
codetermination 
Elect ½ or 2/3 of seats, 
Selects Chairperson 
Elects ½ or 1/3 of seats
1. allowing non-management employees to serve as audit committee members, consistent with "co-determination" and 
similar requirements in some countries; 
2. allowing shareholders to select or ratify the selection of auditors, also consistent with requirements in many foreign 
countries; 
3. allowing alternative structures such as boards of auditors to perform auditor oversight functions where such structures 
are provided for under local law; and 
4. addressing the issue of foreign government shareholder representation on audit committees. 
The new rules also will make several updates to the Commission's disclosure requirements regarding audit committees, 
including updates to the audit committee financial expert disclosure requirements for foreign private issuers. 
Table 3. A Comparison of Responsibilities for Financial Reporting Oversight 
 
Financial Reporting Item       Responsible Board 
 
Germany*   U.S 
           
Prepare financial statements  Management Board  Management 
Assess propriety and 
      appropriateness of  
      accounts   Supervisory Board                  Audit Committee 
Prepare management report  Management Board  Management 
Legal requirement to approve 
 Financial statements Supervisory Board                 Audit Committee 
Review and approval of quarterly 
      financial reports  Supervisory Board                 Audit Committee 
Internal Control system  Management Board  Management 
Risk early recognition system 
    (going concern evaluation) Management Board  External auditors 
Appointment of auditors  Supervisory Board                 Audit Committee 
Role of the external audit  Support Supervisory Board 
      and 
    Perform a control function                Protect public interest 
        In the public interest 
 
*The source for the Financial reporting and other requirements in Germany is the Institut der Wirtschftsprufer’s (German 
equivalent of the AICPA) issues paper Financial Reporting, Auditing and Corporate Governance (2003) 
 
     Shareholders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Legal Structure of Corporate Governance in Germany* 
 
*Jackson, G,. M. Hopner, and A. Kurdelbusch.  2004. Corporate governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, 
Complimentarities, and Tensions. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-009: 49. 
